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Political Networks 
in the Immigration Field
The Power of NGOs against 
Government—an Israeli Case Study
This article examines the role of three non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) involved with immigration in Israel. The 
research demonstrates that these NGOs have accumulated 
informal power in the political network. This approach includes 
several participants: the government—the most powerful 
player—and Tel Aviv resident representatives, international 
human rights organizations, and Knesset members. Using 
networking and other legal means, these NGOs increase their 
power and put pressure on the government. The weakness of 
the Israeli authorities stems also from lack of clear governmental 
policy regarding the immigrant issue. The three NGOs in focus 
want human rights policy to be put into practice for the benefit 
of immigrants and foreign workers. This study concludes that 
these NGOs are increasing their power in the political network 
using the legal arena.
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INTRODUCTION
!is article examines the role of three non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) involved with plight of immigrants, in establishing Israeli 
policy regarding the issue. !e study claims that these NGOs play a 
central role in the political network, even though the authorities do 
not formally consult them and these NGOs lack resources relative to 
governmental agencies. !e main reason for these NGOs’ power and 
in"uence in society is the absence of public policy on immigration. !is 
claim is proved by the theory of political network, which measures the 
power of each network participant.
!e article analyzes the in"uence of the aforementioned NGOs 
and their position in the political network. !e networking approach 
explains connections between organizations inside and outside the 
government, and also expresses the in"uence of these connections 
in determining public policy. !e political network is established by 
encounters among and between authorities, o#cials, interest groups, 
NGOs, economic organizations, and citizens’ representatives. Political 
network power is decentralized since it is di$used among the political 
performers (Alcadipani and Hassard 2010, 420; Bang and Esmark 
2009, 10; Detomasi 2007, 330; Maoz 2009, 225).
THE MIGRATION PHENOMENON 
IN THE GLOBAL ARENA
In recent years, the migration of large numbers of people has become 
a burning issue. Migration is increasing, due especially to cheap 
transportation, the growing gap between rich and poor countries, and 
internal and sectional wars (which, in particular, have created a tsunami 
of homeless asylum seekers). For these people and their countries, 
immigration is a means of survival (Klinov 1999, 25). Mass migration 
has forced developed countries to create new norms and standards 
to prevent discrimination and exploitation in basic work conditions. 
Social security, human rights, and social services have become critical 
issues (Fisher 1999, 16).
In the current milieu, migration can be seen as the problematic 
outcome of globalization and neo-liberal economics, where capital, 
merchandise, and labor forces all work against national interests. !e 
migration issue is causing political storms all over the world (Tzabar 
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2008, 59) and is forcing states to deal with con!icts of interests among 
a wide range of groups. In most cases, civil society tries to shape policy 
through organizations that place human rights on the agenda.
IMMIGRATION POLICY IN ISRAEL
"e Israeli immigrant case is di#erent. Until fairly recently, the State 
of Israel had had no experience of illegal migration of the European or 
US variety. Instead, its focus had been on absorbing Jewish immigrants. 
No clear policy, therefore, had been formulated concerning outside 
workers, and there was, and still is, a lacuna in the relevant immigration 
laws (ibid., 65). 
"e $rst signs of the migration phenomenon appeared in 1967 
after the Six-Day War, when thousands of Palestinian workers arrived 
from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to work in Israel (Semyonov and 
Lerenthal 2005, 76). By 1987, their numbers had grown considerably, 
as had terror attacks on the Israeli population. In response, the 
government imposed a closure on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and 
halted entry of Palestinians. "e result was pressure from employers on 
the government to permit an in!ux of foreign workers.
"e analysis of subsequent governmental policy reveals 
embarrassing failures in policy making and implementation. We 
can see contradictions among ministries, without government 
coordination, planning, or general vision, resulting in a lack of 
enforcement and regulation. Although migration is increasing, the 
country has considered neither the long-term implications of hiring 
massive numbers of migrants, nor the need to protect their rights as 
workers (Avineri et al. 2009, 36; Natan 2009, 88; Nissenkorn 2002, 
39; Semyonov and Lerenthal 2005, 85). "is vacuum is being $lled 
by NGOs devoted to highlighting and promoting migrant workers’ 
human rights. "ese organizations want local laws to be amended to 
re!ect the international human rights laws that Israel is obliged to 
uphold.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
THE POLITICAL NETWORKING APPROACH
!is part will "rst discuss the political network approach, and then, 
in a later section, describe from such an approach the power of the 
NGOs.
In a government system, the authorities have responsibility for 
determining policy, but other performers also act to in#uence the 
political process (Alcadipani and Hassard 2010, 425; Bang and Esmark 
2009, 21; Detomasi 2007, 330; Maoz 2009, 330). Each political issue 
creates interaction among actors, expressing each participant’s power 
in policy making, and thus forming a network. !e network activity has 
ground rules and is based on exchanging resources and participation 
among the actors (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). !e pattern of behavior 
developing in the network is based on identity, political culture, 
training, and exposure to the issue.
!e networking approach o$ers possible explanations for 
the connections (Alcadipani and Hassard 2010, 425; Bang and 
Esmark 2009, 21; Detomasi 2007, 330; Granados and Knoke 2005, 
305; Howlett et al. 2003 90; Maoz 2009, 330). It examines how a 
governmental performer shares resources with other external players—
such as economic "rms, NGOs, and social movements—and o$ers an 
explanation as to how such an interaction in#uences the preservation 
of or a change in public policy (Nachmias and Arbel-Ganz 2006, 60). 
We see that networks have communities with long, stable relations 
with mutual interest in special policy issues. !e question is how much 
real autonomy do o%cials have? !is can be answered by professional 
ethics, their role perception, and resources available to the o%cials 
(Marsh and Rhodes 1992, 30–40).
ANALYZING POLICY BY THE 
POLITICAL NETWORKING APPROACH
!e networking approach is appropriate for policy theories which view 
the policy making procedure from the bottom up. Although o%cial 
policies are determined by government, often junior actors—such 
as o%cials, or non-governmental actors or organizations—deal with 
social problems and shape and in#uence formal policy, as is the case 
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in this study. !ere are methods of mapping the social performers’ 
activity and their relationship with government to analyze networks in 
some "elds (Greenaway et al. 2007).
Van Waarden (1992, 29–52) and DeLeon and Varda (2009, 59–
74) o#ered a typology for analyzing networks, with seven dimensions 
for analyzing political networks, including some of those that were 
used in this research. !is particular study, however, addresses only the 
central features of the aforementioned typology, namely:
Number of actors in 
the network
Who are the actors? Are they 
organizations? What motivates their 
activity? Are they an interest group? 
Are they political actors, and what is 
the pattern of connections between the 
actors?
Identity of the actors Are they governmental, private-sector, or 
from other groups?
Network boundaries Are they open to new actors, or closed 
and monopolistic?
Basis of network 
participation
By coercion or with the participant’s free 
will? Are they based on volunteers like 
NGOs? Frequency of network activity: 
frequent, rare, or varied? How many 
meetings are in the network to decide on 
policymaking?
Level of network 
institutionalization
By coercion or with the participant’s free 
will? Are they based on volunteers like 
NGOs? Frequency of network activity: 
frequent, rare, or varied? How many 
meetings are in the network to decide on 
policymaking?
Power distribution 
among actors
Does the actor enjoy autonomy, or is 
he defended by other actors? Is there 
mutual dependence between actors? Are 
some actors dominant in the network? 
How much power does the government 
wield compared to other network 
organizations?
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NGO POWER IN THE PUBLIC ARENA
NGOs and CSOs (civil society organizations) have become important 
actors in the “soft power” arena of international diplomacy (Steinberg 
2011, 73–88). Diplomats, journalists, academics, and other decision 
makers and opinion leaders routinely accept NGO claims, usually 
without independent veri!cation. NGOs, both individually and 
through wider networks, in"uence many !elds, from environmental 
issues to human rights and humanitarian aid. #eir moral claims are a 
major source of this in"uence, as re"ected in Chandler’s (2004, 85–99) 
reference to NGOs as motivated by universal beliefs. 
Keck and Sikkink (1998, 58) argue that governments are violating 
human rights, leaving individuals or minorities without recourse or 
political power to !ght for their rights. At this point, NGOs enter the 
picture; they apply pressure on governments and are highly in"uential 
(Chandler 2004, 95). #e image is of a government working to ful!ll 
politicians’ interests without feeling obligated to meet public needs 
(Willetts 1996, 89), in contrast to the NGOs’ duty of preserving the 
interests of the common and underprivileged people, and of concerning 
themselves with their human rights. NGOs attempt to enhance 
a more justi!ed ideology, which criticizes Western imperialism 
and capitalism. #eir ideology is re"ected in their publications and 
analyses, particularly regarding application of international law and 
human rights claims (Steinberg 2011, 75).
In recent years, NGOs have gained the ability to promote societal 
roles by increasing external support. Public sector power has been 
weakened relative to that of NGOs; the government is spending 
less money, and state agencies have been discredited and privatized. 
NGOs are entering this void. #eir membership and agencies have 
Other factors 
a!ecting the
Frequency of activity? Homogeneity: Do 
the participants have similar features or 
reciprocity? Do network actors interact 
with senior participants? Do they 
share information? Participation and 
collaboration: Do actors trust the other 
actors? What is the nature of relationships 
between actors? Formal or informal? Is 
there transparency in decision making?
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increased and are replacing the governmental services. NGOs play an 
even greater role in poor and developing countries. !ere, they may 
su"er from a lack of resources, but the state cooperates with them 
by changing the balance of power. Behind the claim of the non-state 
performers’ increased power in shaping and carrying out government 
function, is the relationship between state and non-state performers 
as a zero-sum game: as non-state actors have become more powerful, 
states have become less so by de#nition (ibid., 80).
NGOs exert much political power, particularly regarding moral 
and legal issues. !ey, by creating public pressure, wish to monitor and 
report government behavior concerning human rights (Blitt 2003, 
261–83). !is in$uence is based on the application of “soft power,” 
i.e., achieving public goals by appeal rather than through coercion or 
payments (Nye 2004, 73). Moreover, NGOs promote their agenda 
using network organizations, the Internet, and advanced information 
technologies. !ese tools have greatly enhanced NGOs’ “soft power” 
(Steinberg 2011, 80). !us, NGO networks and their member 
organizations attract and direct media and government attention 
toward their issues (Grant and Keohane 2005, 287–310).
METHODOLOGY
It was necessary to map various categories to examine the role and 
power of NGOs, involved with the plight immigrants, in accordance 
with the political networking approach. Each category was analyzed 
for three particular NGOs, to verify if each organization matched 
the network approach. !ese NGOs work for the human rights of 
immigrants. !ey share some features, but are distinct from each other. 
Some of these NGOs are small and operate in only one area; others 
are large and operate in several #elds. !eir goals di"er slightly, but 
all three NGOs work for human rights on behalf of the marginalized. 
!ese NGOs are the following: the Hotline for Refugees and Migrants 
(HRM), the Workers’ Hotline (WH), and the Association for Civil 
Rights in Israel (ACRI).
!e study was conducted using the qualitative methods of 
interviewing and document analysis. For document analysis, the 
researchers used written texts to learn about human behavior relevant 
to the study. !e researchers also established several criteria and rules 
for analysis, in order to limit their own subjectivity. !e analysis, in 
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turn, was performed on two levels: the !rst was the overt dimension, 
analyzing data gathered in the !eld; the second was the researchers’ 
own interpretation, giving meaning to the !ndings. "e !nal step 
involved relating the interpretations to existing theories, or improving 
or changing the theories (Yim 2013, 56).
To analyze the actors’ position in the network, we examined 
the minutes of the meetings of the Knesset Committee on Foreign 
Workers. "is committee invites representatives from the general 
public. Reading the minutes reveals something about the network 
participants, their relative power, and their attitude to those actors. 
"e analysis of the minutes also demonstrates the formal and informal 
relationships among the political actors. "e Knesset committee does 
not establish formal policy, but, in e#ect, the committee climate shapes 
future policy. "is study analyzed the minutes of six meetings that took 
place between April 2012 and May 2013.
We also used twenty-!ve interviews with !fteen paid NGO sta# 
workers and ten NGO volunteers. Some interviews were ethnographic, 
and some were assisted by a semi-structured questionnaire. Each 
interview lasted for about two hours and took place with senior 
workers and managers from the three NGOs (ibid., 82).
We interviewed key !gures who established the organizations, such 
as the original WH general manager, as well as their current general 
manager and lawyer. We interviewed the following at ACRI: the 
current general manager, lawyer, the manager (who, until 2013, had run 
the “hotline” for nine years), the governmental relations manager, and 
the manager responsible for combating human tra$cking. At ACRI, 
as well as at HRM, we interviewed the lawyer employed there for 
more than ten years. He is an expert in the foreign sector of the Israeli 
parliament interior ministry, and also handles petitions to the High 
Court. We also interviewed several people holding senior positions in 
the o$ces of the immigration and population public authorities, i.e., 
those of spokesman and legal adviser. "ese interviews provided us 
with informal information, unavailable in the aforementioned minutes 
or on the organizations’ websites, and this knowledge enabled us to 
analyze the organizations’ cultural and behavioral features. "e goal 
was mapping the network categories. "e analysis was not only built on 
formal knowledge, but especially on the informal relations mentioned 
by the informant (e.g., sometimes representatives are not invited to 
o$cial committees, but can access the leaders making the decisions; 
converse situations are also possible, when the NGO representatives 
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are frequently invited to formal meetings, but nobody shows interest 
in their recommendations).
INTRODUCTION TO FINDINGS
!is study will analyze the strategies and activities of the HRM, 
the WH, and the ACRI. We will present "ndings and data analysis 
collected from interviews with employees, and from published 
information on their websites and in other settings, such as court 
orders and governmental documents (!e Knesset 2008, 2012b). 
!ese NGOs have diverse characteristics, since each concerns itself 
with a di#erent aspect of the plight of immigrants, which is also often 
a source of disagreement between them.
!e HRM is a nonpro"t and non-partisan organization with 
the goal of protecting and promoting the human rights of migrant 
workers and refugees, and of preventing human tra$cking in Israel. 
It was founded in 1998 by a group of citizens who decided to unite, 
following a series of articles published in the weekly !e City in Tel 
Aviv, about migrant worker exploitation. It is committed to upholding 
the rights of migrants, especially in the Jewish state, since the Jewish 
population has itself experienced persecution as an alien minority. 
As they put it (HRM, n.d.), “We are committed to eradicating the 
exploitation of migrants, ensuring they receive the correct measure of 
respect and fairness, and to the formulation of government policies 
that will ensure this. We seek to serve as the mouthpiece for those who 
are not heard in the public sphere and to build an Israeli society which 
is just, egalitarian, and democratic.”
!e WH, the second NGO, is a non-pro"t organization that has 
aimed to protect workers’ rights in Israel since its inception in 1991. Its 
vision is to fully and faithfully comply with international conventions 
and their implementation, and grant social and economic rights and 
legal residence status to refugees and asylum seekers in Israel, so that 
they might enjoy independence and dignity. !e organization helps 
Israeli workers, migrant workers, Palestinians, and refugees, to realize 
their rights as workers. !e association also works to change legislation 
and increase awareness. It has three branches in Israel (Tel Aviv, Haifa, 
and Jerusalem) and two branches in the Palestinian Authority (Qalqilya 
and Jericho), and works with local coordinators to assist Palestinians 
employed in Jewish settlements in the West Bank (WH, n.d.).
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!e ACRI, the third and last NGO, has worked, since its formation 
in 1972, to protect human rights and promote them “wherever 
violations are committed by the Israeli authorities or on their behalf ” 
(ACRI, n.d.). !e organization deals with the full gamut of human 
rights: freedom of speech, the right to health care, protection of 
human rights in the occupied territories, freedom of worship, the right 
to full civil equality, protection of Internet privacy, and more. As an 
independent and professional organization, its policy is not to request 
or receive funding from the government or any political party in Israel. 
Its vision is to help people maintain their rights “in any country, at 
any time, where civil initiative is needed, from releasing people from 
the e"ects of harmful authority to uncompromisingly preserving 
human rights. Israel needs these rights enforced, given the absence 
of a written constitution. Economic interests and security concerns 
frequently take precedence over human rights, and many individuals 
and groups in Israel are denied full and equal rights and su"er from 
sustained institutionalized discrimination. !is is despite the fact that 
human rights are the foundation of any democratic government, and 
are the essential key to freedom, dignity, and equality for all” (ibid.).
FINDINGS
!is study analyzed the categories of the political networking approach, 
by focusing on three NGOs involved with immigration, based on Van 
Waarden’s (1992, 29–52) and DeLeon and Varda’s (2009, 59–74) 
typology.
NUMBER OF ACTORS AND THEIR IDENTITIES
!e network is built by various political actors representing di"erent 
interests and attitudes. !e government navigates its policy with 
several demands: that it be legal, re#ect Israeli dominant culture, and 
serve the state’s economic and national interests. !e NGOs involved 
with immigration concern themselves with the rights immigrants 
and the provision of social services, such as health insurance, living 
accommodations, the ability to move within the country, etc. Some 
NGOs are branches of international corporations like Amnesty 
International-Israel. !ey supervise governmental policy in line 
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with the international human rights agreements to which Israel is 
committed. Other network players are civilian groups representing 
the interest of south Tel Aviv, who wish to improve their standard 
of living, and demand that the government minimize the number of 
foreigners in their neighborhood. !e petitions to the Supreme Court 
make them in"uential actors, who advocate and shape public norms 
and rules. !is article does not discuss the manpower companies 
which import foreign labor and charge high and illegal fees from the 
workers. In addition, the immigrants themselves have organizations. 
!e employees are also an interest group, which lobby the government 
to increase foreign worker quotas. !e relationships among the actors 
build the political network, and the competition between them for 
dominance in"uences public policy (WH, n.d.).
!e WH website presents an example of the way the WH work 
with the authorities. !e organization published a paper about hourly-
wage earners in !e Forum for the Enforcement of Workers’ Rights, later 
presented to an Israeli Knesset committee in July 2014. !e data 
concerned a million workers employed on an hourly basis and the 
violations of their human rights. !e participants in this committee 
meeting included Knesset members, representatives of the Ministry 
of Economics, representatives of the Ministry of Justice, leaders of 
human rights workers’ organizations, and individual employers (ibid.).
Another example of cooperation with ministerial-level authorities 
was when the WH complained to the Ministry of Industry and Labor 
about employers exploiting Palestinian workers. !e organization 
produced a report about the problem, with suggested legal solutions, 
and successfully demanded that the authorities take action against the 
dishonest employers (ibid.).
!is article discusses the location of NGOs involved with 
immigrants in the political network. !ese organizations have a forum 
of eight NGOs, all of them supporting services to the immigrants, 
with each organization focusing on a particular aspect. !e forum is 
called the Refugees Rights Forum. It includes the HRM, the WH, 
the ACRI, Physicians for Human Rights-Israel (PHR-IL), the Aid 
Organization for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Israel (ASSAF), the 
Refugee Right Clinic, Amnesty International (AI), and the African 
Refugee Development Center (ARDC).
!ese organizations share similar features: !e oldest organization 
is the ACRI, which was established in 1972; the WH was established 
in 1991, the HRM in 2008, PHR-IL in 1988, the Refugee Right 
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Clinic in 2002, AI in 1998, the ARDC in 2004, and ASSAF in 2007. 
!ese organizations subsist on contributions; some also receive small 
amounts of government funds. !ey have diverse goals: some are active 
among the immigrant and refugee populations, but others, like the 
WH, also help Israeli citizens. ACRI’s goal is very broad and concerns 
itself with legal and illegal action regarding immigrants, refugees, and 
citizens.
NETWORK BOUNDARIES
!is was examined among all the actors—NGOs and governmental 
agencies—but the nature of the boundaries among the NGOs 
themselves are also important. !e NGOs were found to have open 
boundaries, although they are di"erent and there is sometimes friction 
between them. Analysis of the three researched NGOs indicates 
collaboration and trust among them, i.e., their o#ces are in the same 
building, they have work relations, and they meet very frequently. !e 
workers have established informal connections and friendships. An 
example of their close relationship is that if one representative appears 
before the Knesset committee he formally or informally represents the 
other organizations when promoting policies concerning other NGOs.
!e governmental authorities are not formally open. !e 
NGOs are not an integral part of shaping public policy, but existing 
policymakers understand the special expertise of the veteran NGOs 
and frequently invite them to decision-making meetings and forums. 
One of the NGO representatives said, “!e working environment 
against the government is very complicated; there is both cooperation 
and war. We try to have in$uence from the inside, to appear in debates 
and voice our opinions. If we fail, we then petition the Supreme Court” 
(WH lawyer 2013).
Policy makers know that. Another informant reported, “!e 
government o#cials have openly told us that it is very good a civil 
society exists, but covertly they do not like our activity. Some clerks 
think we are causing damage to the state. !e authorities do not 
understand what values motivate us; the establishment is stolid and 
obtuse towards humanity” (ACRI leader 2013). Another volunteer 
added, “!ey hated us at the beginning, but in time we developed 
personal relations, talking together leads to good things” (HRM 
volunteer A 2013).
69Political Networks in the Immigration Field
An ACRI lawyer (A 2013) related, “Once or twice we met the 
head of the Population and Immigration Authority and solved the 
problem before the petition to the Supreme Court. After the meeting 
they changed their policy and we dropped our petition.”
!e WH general manager (2012) said, “Working with the 
Population and Immigration Authority is very di"cult. It is very 
bureaucratic, and bureaucracy in the institutions is an ideology; it is 
very slow and ine#ective. !e immigration authorities su#er from 
a lack of workers, the state is overloaded with much work. !is is 
compatible with public policy.” A hotline worker also said, “!e 
years are passing by, our workers become more professional, and the 
governmental authorities are consulting us and getting aid from us. 
When they promote a new procedure, they ask us for our opinion. 
Even though they ask for our assistance, they simultaneously attack us 
on another issue” (Hotline worker 2012). !ese examples demonstrate 
the complicated picture: although the general pattern is a closed 
network, some of the connections with the authorities show some 
openness. Although there are essential di#erences, policy makers 
understand that the NGOs are part of the political network. !e fact 
that government initiates consultation rather than only responding to 
court petitions is a small hole in the closed boundaries. !e NGOs’ 
voice is heard, they accept public venues to criticize policy. All these 
examples indicate a border which is partially and occasionally open. 
!e boundaries among the three NGOs are blurred; this was 
expressed by the patterns of behavior and informal communication 
among the NGOs. !ere are varied friendships, professional 
relationships, and substantive issues between employees of these 
organizations. According to the interviews, employees in these 
organizations share a language and values that most of the public do not 
share. Respondents indicated the existence of personal relationships 
both within and between organizations (e.g., one man works for ACRI 
while his partner works for the WH). Another example of personal 
connections beyond the scope of work is in the case of work calls, 
where one respondent testi$ed that he could not separate personal 
calls from work calls, because his friends are his colleagues. Most of 
the interviewees are people who volunteered in these organizations 
before being employed in them and moved between the di#erent 
organizations over the years.
In addition, physical proximity contributes to social closeness. !e 
three o"ces of these organizations are located in Tel Aviv in the same 
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building, and informal meetings during o!ce hours may take place 
between workers of di"erent organizations. One of the volunteers 
said, “Everyone here takes part in everything. #ere is harmony, and 
since we are constantly exposed to heart-rending stories, we need a 
supportive environment. Even our low wages are part of our world 
view where our values would not allow us to earn a lot more than our 
clients” (WH volunteer C 2013). Another WH worker said, “Informal 
relations can be good and bad. #ere are advantages, but sometimes 
problems can occur when the situation or occasion demands 
formality. #is can happen when de$ning roles, managing the order of 
operations, deciding who is to review a particular job, or determining 
what happens next” (Hotline worker 2012). A number of respondents 
said that their circle of friends consisted mainly of colleagues from 
other organizations. As to the question of con%icts between employees 
of di"erent organizations, most respondents answered that it occurred 
mainly in the choice of operational strategies and content. 
BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION
Members of these NGOs participate out of free will. People work 
in these organizations because of internal obligation and belief in 
human rights. #e network’s state representatives also believe and 
act ideologically. One of the Hotline advocates said, “Both sides are 
motivated by a mission—a private advocate will earn much more than 
in governmental agencies or immigrant NGOs. #e establishment 
representatives are also motivated by a mission, the state does not 
provide $nancial reward like a private $rm” (Hotline advocate 2013). 
#e three organizations’ participation in the network is voluntary, 
and their network positions are in%uenced by their public image. #e 
Hotline general manager (2013) said that public opinion and media 
attitude are important for fundraisers, “If the environment is hostile, 
public goals cannot be accomplished” (Hotline general manager 2013). 
NGO participation can be analyzed through their involvement in 
Knesset meetings (ibid.).
Signi$cantly, NGO participation is not institutionalized, even 
though they have accumulated power as organizations participating 
in the immigration issue public discourse. A plan was presented at the 
Knesset Special Committee on Foreign Workers (#e Knesset 2012c) 
regarding how to deal with refugees seeking asylum. Participating 
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in this meeting were representatives of refugees, foreign workers, 
and governmental agencies (with the participation of the Ministry 
of Economy; Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor; Ministry for 
Senior Citizens; and the Population and Immigration Authority). 
!e NGO representatives were workers from organizations assisting 
foreign workers, a refugee seeking asylum, the UNHCR (the UN 
High Commission for Refugees), and PHR-IL. 
During a committee debate, one NGO representative challenged 
a governmental decision, until the chairman (Knesset Member Nitzan 
Horowitz) told her, “I would ask you to promote the discourse and 
not confrontation. What do you expect? Here we do not shout, you 
have been dealing with this issue for a long time, please present your 
position clearly, how you see things.” !e representative responded, 
“!e State of Israel needs to check the asylum petitions, and "nd out 
who will be entitled to refugee status and it should grant them this 
position. In the meantime the state needs to enable the newcomers to 
work, their detention is very problematic to the state—how to handle 
long-term detention facilities.” Most of the debates are conducted in 
good spirits, the NGOs participate and their representatives also ask 
questions.
FREQUENCY OF ACTIVITY
NGO involvement in policy making and implementation is very 
high, but they do defend governmental policy. However, if the 
policy is perceived as abusive or as o#ending human rights, NGO 
activity grows and is empowered. 
!e NGOs also operate in ways di#erent from their usual form 
of activity. For example, they once used celebrities to pressure the 
government regarding deportation of immigrants’ children.
Another example is when the Knesset updated the law on 
intruders, enabling three years detention. !e passing of this law 
led to the NGOs protesting and petitioning the Supreme Court. 
Other incidents were petitions regarding procedures against 
pregnant woman who were deported from the country, with the 
NGOs trying to stop it. !ese organizations also act to improve 
foreign workers’ working conditions, to criticize the collection of 
agency brokerage fees, and to "ght against exploitation and sex 
tra$cking of women.
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!e organizations have the opportunity to frequently 
participate in Knesset committees. !ey participate in almost every 
Special Committee on Foreign Workers meeting. !ey come to 
these meetings to state their views and express criticism against the 
authorities. 
In a meeting (!e Knesset 2012a) regarding the deportation of 
Sudanese refugees from Israel, for example, forty-two government 
invitees participated (from the population authorities, Department 
of Justice). Most of these invitees were from NGOs: the Refugee 
Rights Clinic at Tel Aviv University, the UNHCR, ASSAF, the 
Center for Foreign Workers, the ACRI, AI representatives, the 
Combat Genocide Association, the Social Guard, representatives of 
southern Tel Aviv organizations, representatives of the Voice of the 
Neighborhood, and neighborhood committees. In the course of this 
meeting, one of the immigrants’ representatives said the authorities 
were working very slowly and bureaucratically—that is, when the 
immigration authority’s representative asked for a formal petition, 
the NGOs replied that they had already sent dozens of cases.
Another Special Committee on Foreign Workers meeting (!e 
Knesset 2013a) discussed reform regarding employing foreign 
workers in nursing. Forty representatives of the authorities and 
NGOs participated in this debate, from Helpline for the Elderly, 
Employers’ Hotline, WH, regional campaigns for the disabled, 
relief organizations, the Social Guard, etc. In this meeting, the WH 
representative raised the issue of realty fees—that is, that foreign 
workers were paying illegal money and that the issue needed to be 
addressed. !ere was confrontation between the WH representative 
and representatives of the disabled (who need foreign workers). 
Such a representative directly approached a hotline worker and 
asked, “Why do the disabled need to su"er?” She said she supports 
the reform, but it is important to preserve workers’ rights and 
said, “If they got everything they need—then they wouldn’t need 
us.” Tension ran high until the relief organization representative 
complained, “You are the reason why they behave this way—
because of the hotline workers, they do what they want.” One of 
the volunteers who participated in the Knesset debates described 
the arena as hosting con#ict and confrontation between nursing 
workers and other weak populations. She believes, “We need to take 
care of weak populations, but not at the expense of weakening other 
populations” (WH volunteer C 2013).
73Political Networks in the Immigration Field
INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL
!ere is no formal institutionalization among network players. !ere 
is very little formal connection between authorities and immigrant 
NGOs; most contact is through informal relationships. An ACRI 
advocate claimed he regularly meets with the head of the Population 
and Immigrant Authority—this can indicate some institutionalization, 
but it is not a formal rule or regulation.
!e authorities are not obliged to meet the immigrant NGOs and 
invite them to decision-making forums. !ese informal relations are 
complicated: “We have a love-hate relationship with the government. 
We believe a constant dialogue with the authorities is necessary. We 
keep meeting with the police, custody courts, immigration authorities, 
and Knesset members, although they do not like us” (HRM lawyer C 
2013). In one of the meetings of the Knesset Committee on Foreign 
Workers, the chairman announced the NGO representatives could not 
talk (HRM volunteer B 2013). !is incident was relevant to the former 
Knesset, after the last (2013) election. !e current chairman is more 
sympathetic to immigrant NGOs and allows them to participate in 
the discussions. We can learn the importance of the chairman in the 
Knesset on the relationship between the network players from this case.
Although there are informal relations in this Knesset, the 
immigrant NGOs attend the Foreign Workers’ Committee. In a 
meeting discussing the residents of southern Sudan (!e Knesset 
2012d), all representatives earlier above were present. !e Relief Center 
representative described a di"cult situation in which many refugees 
are locked up for long time periods (she gave exact numbers of men, 
women, children, time of their detention, petition, and ECT). She asked 
to take care of all the cases, not only ones that have become famous on 
Facebook or in the media. !e ASSAF representative noted, “We are 
working on very complicated social cases, and I speak on behalf of the 
doctors working with us. !e bureaucratic adventure of the refugees 
is impossible, we cannot make an appointment at our request, people 
are arrested while their application is on the way to the Ministry of 
the Interior, sick people are sitting in jail. When their application was 
served, they had already have been put on a plane, because they could 
not support themselves #nancially” (WH volunteer A 2012). 
!e advocators’ clinic representative was describing the abuse of 
immigrant children—they were thrown out of their houses, he said: 
“!e Ministry of the Interior is acting according to Welfare Ministry 
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instructions, which is ignoring the children’s problems. Social workers 
report that it is critical to bring the children to their parents, the Welfare 
Ministry is ignoring the problem, so we petitioned the Supreme Court” 
(HRM lawyer A 2013). 
!e criticism of governmental authorities is palpable, but NGO 
representatives are also heard because the committee chairman, Nitzan 
Horowitz, is more sympathetic to the immigrant problems. !e 
chairman announced at the end of the meeting, “!e people sitting 
here, I appreciate professionally; they are partners in the committee 
debates” (ACRI lawyer B 2013).
DISTRIBUTION OF POWER
Usually power remains with the government. !e NGOs want to a"ect 
formal policy by enhancing public awareness, exerting pressure from 
the bottom up, but also in the opposite direction, by putting pressure 
on the authorities from the top down. !is can be accomplished by 
involvement with senior o#cials and Knesset members who shape 
public policy. In the words of one volunteer, “!ere are Knesset 
members we know will help us promote our agenda: Nitzan Horowitz, 
Zahava Gal-on, Orit Noked, and Dov Khenin. We are not strong 
players against the authorities, we often want to join the discussion 
but they don’t allow us” (ACRI volunteer B 2013). From another 
interview: “We are not an equal partner in decision-making. When 
visiting the Saharonim detention facility [refugees seeking asylum 
are sitting there], we did not receive permission to participate in the 
visit. !e Attorney General and the jail authorities refused us” (ACRI 
volunteer A 2013).
!e distribution of power also takes place among NGOs. !ese 
organizations participate in Knesset committees and $ght against 
CSOs representing south Tel Aviv residents hurt by the appearance of 
the foreigners. !e meeting held on 21 May 2012 (!e Knesset 2012e) 
was an urgent discussion, as a result of south Tel Aviv residents. !e 
participants were the following: representatives from the Hotline, the 
UNHCR, southern Tel Aviv residents, the Voice of the Neighborhood, 
and the neighborhood watch, the chairman of the Neveh Shaanan 
and Shapira neighborhood committees (areas in south Tel Aviv). !e 
Hotline representative asked the government to allow asylum seekers 
to be recognized as refugees, the southern Tel Aviv representatives 
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angrily attacked her and said she was lying—the chairman needed 
to interfere and stop the argument. She wanted to help the asylum 
seekers have the possibility of working during their stay in Israel. 
!e in"uence of immigrant NGOs and their informal power in 
the network is also re"ected in Minutes No. 84 of the Committee of 
Foreign Workers, which examined the problems of foreign workers 
(!e Knesset 2012b). !e meeting agenda was about coping with 
the police force and their attitude towards foreign workers. !e 
same discussion is also re"ected in other minutes (!e Knesset 
2013c). All these transcripts demonstrate that immigrant NGOs in 
Israel accumulate informal in"uence and cannot be ignored by the 
authorities, that their voice is heard and that policymakers take their 
attitudes toward immigrants seriously.
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG 
IMMIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS
!is part of the study found high compatibility between the features 
identifying political networks as described by DeLeon and Varda 
(2009).
Homogeneity. !e interviewers testi#ed that their organization 
and network colleagues share similar ideological and cultural views 
and beliefs. One hotline worker said, “!e workers in immigrant 
NGOs have one language and a similar world of values, which most 
of the public is not sensitive to—only those working with weak 
populations become sensitive to them. We think of the oppressor, who 
is he o$ending?” (HRM lawyer B 2013). In another interview one 
worker said, “Most of the workers are women, Arabs, homosexuals, 
some straight men, most of the workers are leftwing and Ashkenazic” 
(HRM worker 2013). Another informant added, “!ere is harmony 
between the workers because we are exposed to di%cult stories that we 
emotionally need to share. !ere is a great deal of transparency between 
the workers, we send emails to everyone—everyone is involved” (WH 
volunteer B 2013).
Reciprocity. !e senior social players share knowledge and 
frequently interact, and this is clearly expressed. !e workers and 
volunteers are close friends from the same association or other 
immigrant organizations. !ey have volunteered for many years and 
there is often transition from one organization to another, as well 
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as mutual support (e.g., in Knesset committees, colleagues from one 
organization help other immigrant associations). An HRM advocate 
(2013) said, “Regarding legal and professional issues I consult with 
other advocates from other immigrant organizations.”
Collaboration. NGO members participate with their colleagues 
when they share trust and informal relationships. We found this kind 
of relationship within the three NGOs: long-term collaboration, 
covering the same assignments, transparency regarding network 
decision making, the same organizational structures, equal status 
among NGOs leaders. !ese mutual characters can be identi"ed at 
social events, petitions to the Supreme Court, appealing to Knesset 
committees and the media. Collaboration was mentioned in all the 
interviews, “We have a forum for representatives from several NGOs 
to meet. We have mutual events like the recognition of foreigners’ 
children during 2011. Volunteers were active together, created 
tutorials, and recruited other NGOs for this purpose. Sometimes the 
collaboration is ad hoc for one mission. For instance, a budget arrived 
from the EU to treat immigrant children in jail, everyone began to 
work with the ‘Israeli Natives,’ or the Sinai victims. We treat them 
with the PHR-IL” (WH volunteer D 2013).
DISCUSSION
!is article examined the theory of political networking in the case of 
three Israeli NGOs involved with immigration. Political networking 
was found to be very relevant in explaining the relationships among all 
political actors. !ere is great mutual trust among NGOs: they share 
the same left-wing ideology and agree on the same goals and strategies 
to accomplish them.
!e immigrant associations have a mutual interest in creating a 
strong coalition to promote newcomers’ human rights. !eir moral 
claims and universal beliefs are a major source of this in#uence on the 
media (Blitt 2003, 96; Chandler 2004, 99; Granados and Knoke 2005, 
287–34; Howlett et al. 2003, 205–10; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000, 
138), but there is more limited e$ect on the Israeli government. Only 
massive publicity can shake the government, which is reluctant to act 
regarding immigration.
!e NGOs exchange information within the network, and 
resources are not material ones (Nachmias and Arbel-Ganz 2006, 90–
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111). CSOs representing the south Tel Aviv population participate in 
the network and act against the immigrant NGOs interests. !ey try 
to stop illegal immigration since the local population wants to prevent 
the foreigners’ immigration for several reasons. Other partners are 
the Supreme Court of Justice, which blocks the orders, and thereby 
in"uences government policy. Human rights associations in Israel and 
abroad shape the rules and act as watchdogs, monitoring and publishing 
Israeli authorities’ civil rights violations. Knesset members are partners 
in the network, and governmental agencies are also highly in"uential 
participants. !e employees’ organizations and workers agencies are 
partners in the network, since they are interested in preserving low 
salaries for the immigrants. According to Alcadipani and Hassard 
(2010, 419–35), Bang and Esmark (2009, 7–30), Detomasi (2007, 
321–34), Maoz (2009, 223–40), and Van Waarden (1992, 29–52), 
political networking in the Israeli case study can be characterized by 
several dimensions.
!e political actors are the immigrant NGOs—not only the three 
associations studied but also other interest groups involved in the 
network—governmental o#ces representatives, and Israeli Knesset 
members (from the opposition). !e NGOs have open boundaries, 
with members moving from one to another. !ey work as one block 
against the Israeli authorities. !e boundaries between them and the 
Israeli agencies are closed; they view these NGOs as troublemakers 
and try to avoid their in"uencing governmental policy. But the 
governmental agencies frequently need help and advice, and then open 
the meetings to NGO representatives. !e boundaries are formally 
closed, but informal relationships occasionally create openness. !e 
NGOs participate out of free will and with a deep commitment to 
the newcomers, but governmental agencies act in line with their 
formal duties and represent formal policy—stopping immigration 
and deporting illegal foreigners—while left-wing opposition Knesset 
members cooperate more with the NGOs and sympathize more with 
their goals. !e meetings are frequent, but institutionalization level is 
relatively low, since these NGOs are active on a random basis, when a 
problem needs solving. !e government must be in contact with those 
bodies as a result of the NGOs’ legal activity, but there is no regular 
connection with the authorities (DeLeon and Varda 2009, 59–74).
!e government responds compulsively; it does not want to share 
its policy with the immigrant associations, and accomplishes its aims 
through court orders. !e state has much central power regarding this 
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matter and its policy is hostile to immigrant associations. Governmental 
representatives try to dictate a very strict and rigid policy, which leads 
to an aggressive reaction on behalf of the immigrant NGOs. Although 
the government is a very powerful social network performer, its 
strength is greatly limited (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000, 135–58). Israel 
is a democratic state. It cannot ignore international law and human 
rights. !e immigrant NGOs are aware of Israeli governmental 
limitations and use this fact to their bene"t, to empower their position 
through the legal arena.
!e immigrant associations’ power emanates also from their 
high-level humanitarian commitment and large-scale solidarity and 
involvement (Blitt 2003, 88; Grant and Keohane 2005, 90; Nye 2004, 
115). !ey also gain power by their consistency; they persist until 
achieving their aims in court. !e hostility among government o#ces 
causes the NGOs to unite and help each other, share information, and 
have more in$uence. As noted, these organizations are professional 
and the volunteers are also highly educated. !eir weakness in the 
immigration "eld is the hostility manifested also by common Israelis, 
who support public policy. But these NGOs eventually succeed in 
applying legal pressure on and monitoring the Israeli government.
Another source of power for these NGOs is lack of policy in this 
area (Natan 2009, 112; Nissenkorn 2002, 87; Semyonov and Lerenthal 
2005, 55). !is case study highlights government weakness in trying 
to deal with the immigration issue by ignoring the problem. !e 
NGOs dealing with immigration enter this vacuum and replace the 
role of governmental services, by o%ering solutions, or by petitioning 
the Supreme Court of Justice. !eir vigorous activity and initiatives 
creates political power. !e governmental ministries are aware of their 
court achievements, so they consult with the immigrant NGOs before 
legislation to prevent embarrassing court "ascos.
!e NGOs exert a great deal of political power, particularly 
regarding moral and legal issues. !ey want to monitor and report 
government human rights behavior by creating public pressure, usually 
based on “soft power” (Blitt 2003, 95; Nye 2004, 120). For instance, 
the researched NGOs promote their agenda by providing information, 
legal aid, consultation, and also use the Internet and advanced 
information technologies. Finally, their networking gains media and 
government attention (Grant and Keohane 2005, 29–43).
Nye (2004, 88) and Steinberg (2011, 73–88) mentioned “soft 
power” as a mean of achieving NGO goals. We see in this study that 
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“soft power” is in adequate for combating governmental authorities. !e 
Israeli public is also hostile to the immigrants, and their representatives 
cooperate with the authorities, especially citizens resident in south 
Tel Aviv. !ey complain about the newcomers, since there have been 
some violent incidents in their neighborhood. !e immigrant NGOs 
also use the media and try to create a friendlier environment, but the 
majority of the Israeli population is unsupportive, and demand the 
government is more e"cient in closing borders and deporting the 
uninvited foreigners.
CONCLUSIONS
!is case study about three Israeli NGOs in the immigration #eld 
teaches us that it operates as a network system. !e participants in the 
network are extremely sophisticated and use legal and “soft power” 
to achieve their social aims. !e great solidarity and mutual left-
wing ideology of the network, and legal means, are helping them to 
overcome a strong partner in the network, like the Israeli government. 
Another cause that weakens the Israeli authorities is the vacuum in 
immigration policy. !e well-organized network coalition knows how 
to bene#t from this situation. !e immigration vacuum is #lled by the 
various activities of Israeli NGOs, which have reached achievements 
in the legal arena.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
!is case study can help other NGOs learn how to use a complicated 
political situation to their advantage—especially when working for 
underprivileged and weak populations within a hostile social climate. 
Well organized, educated, and devoted NGO members, using legal 
means, can overcome a strong political participant.
LIMITATIONS
We used the typology of Van Waarden (1992, 29–52) and DeLeon and 
Varda (2009, 59–74), but could only #nd the main characteristics of the 
model. It is important to mention that this typology is an ideal type, 
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and we examined the complicated reality in Israel in the immigration 
!eld. For instance, we could not provide an exact number of all the 
in"uencing actors in this network, and probably missed some of the 
participants. We also could not describe all the formal and informal 
connections and interactions. #is research focused on the increasing 
power of NGOs in the immigration !eld in the network, and the 
sociological and political causes of this phenomenon. Although, there 
were many limitations, this typology was a helpful tool in analyzing the 
powerful position of the researched NGOs in the political network.
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